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CASE NOTES
Admiralty -Jurisdiction over
Aviation Tort Claims
A SIGNIFICANT RELATIONSHIP TO TRADITIONAL MARITIME ACTIVITY
SUPPORTS ADMIRALTY JURISDICTION OVER A WRONGFUL DEATH ACTION
ARISING FROM THE CRASH OF A GREEK AIRLINER INTO TERRITORIAL
WATERS DURING A FLIGHT FROM A GREEK ISLAND TO THE MAINLAND.
Hammill v. Olympic Airways S.A.,
398 F. Supp. 829 (D.D.C. 1975).
While vacationing in Europe Ms. Caroline Hammill Cagle, a
United States citizen and resident of Virginia, made a side-trip
to the Greek island of Corfu in the Mediterranean.' In Corfu
she purchased a one-way ticket to Athens, Greece, from the ticket
office of the defendant airliner.2 On its approach to the Athens
airport, the airliner crashed into Voula Bay within one mile of
land, resulting in Ms. Cagle's death. Plaintiff, who is the admin-
istrator of decedent's estate, filed an amended complaint 3 seeking
damages for wrongful death from the Greek airline under four
theories of recovery: 1) A common law cause of action for wrong-
ful death under 28 U.S.C. §1332(a)(2); 4 2) A wrongful death
action based on the Montreal Agreement5 which raised the liabil-
I This excursion to Corfu was not covered by the roundtrip ticket to Europe.
The roundtrip ticket was purchased in the U.S. from a carrier other than the
defendant.
2 The defendant also maintains a ticket office in Washington, D.C. - a fact
stipulated to by both parties. Hammill at 831.
3 The amended complaint reflected the addition of the fourth theory of re-
covery in admiralty.
I The statute provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of all civil actions
where the matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000,
exclusive of interest and costs, and is between - (2) citizens of a state,
and foreign states or citizens or subjects thereof.
5 C.A.B. Order No. E23680 Docket 17325, Montreal Agreement C.A.B.
18900, May 13, 1966, found in 44 C.A.B. Rep. 819 (1960), [hereinafter referred to
as Montreal Agreement]. This Agreement by the signatory members of IATA
(International Air Transport Association), is a contractual increase in the dam-
age limitations imposed by the Warsaw Convention and approved by the Civil
Aeronautics Board on May 13, 1966. It is the direct result of economic pres-
sures generated by a notice of denunciation of the Warsaw Convention served
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ity limitations of the Warsaw Convention6 and the Hague Pro-
tocol; 7 3) A wrongful death action based on the common law the-
ory of Absolute Liability; and 4) An action for wrongful death
founded on general maritime law under 28 U.S.C. §1333(1)8 and
the Death on the High Seas Act 46 U.S.C. %761 et seq.9
Defendant moved to dismiss the amended complaint for lack of
jurisdiction and for failure to state a claim upon which relief might
be granted. Held, motion denied: federal admiralty jurisdiction
exists and a wrongful death action is stated where the ill-fated
flight bore a significant relationship to the function traditionally
performed by maritime vessels, even though the crash occurred in
Greek domestic waters as opposed to the high seas.
The admiralty jurisdiction of the federal courts is grounded in
Article I1, Section 2 of the Constitution, which declares that
"[t]he judicial power of the United States shall extend to ...
by the United States Government to become effective May 15, 1966. The
signatory members of TATA staved off this action by assuming an obligation
among themselves to pay a maximum of $75,000 per passenger, regardless of
fault, for injuries sustained in "international flight" as covered by the Warsaw
Convention art.3.
6 49 Stat. 3000 et seq. (1934), T.S.No. 876 (effective Oct. 29, 1934). The
Warsaw Convention Treaty, adhered to by the United States in 1934, limited
damages to approximately $10,000 (current valuation) resulting from death or
injury caused by the negligence of an airline during air travel wherein the ad-
herents to the Treaty were ticketed nations of origin and destination.
I This Treaty, concluded in 1955, became effective August 1, 1963 and in-
creased the maximum liability of the airlines from $10,000 to approximately
$18,000 (current valuation). Although the Hague Protocol was not ratified by
the United States it could in some situations, "apply to United States Citizens
as well as all people of the world, regardless of citizenship, since it depends
solely upon their ticketed ultimate places of origin or destination." J. Kennelly,
Aviation Law: International Air Travel - A Brief Diagnosis and Prognosis, 56
CHICAGO BAR RECORD No. 4,178,180 (Jan-Feb. 1975).
1 The statutue provides:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction, exclusive of the courts
of the states, of: (1) Any civil case of Admiralty or maritime jurisdic-
tion, saving to suitors in all cases all other remedies to which they are
otherwise entitled.
9 The Death on the High Seas Act [hereinafter DOSHA] provides in
761:
Whenever the death of a person shall be caused by wrongful act, neglect,
or default occuring on the high seas beyond a marine league from the
shore of any state, or the District of Columbia or the Territories or
dependencies of the United States, the personal representative of the
decedent may maintain a suit for damages in the district courts of the
United States, in admiralty, for the exclusive benefit of the decedent's
wife, husband, parent, child or dependent relative against the vessel,
person, or corporation which would have been liable if death had not
ensued.
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
all Cases of admiralty and maritime jurisdiction." Congress also
provided a specific forum for admiralty jurisdiction but failed
to define its scope in the Judiciary Act of 1789 which merely
provided:
The district courts shall have original jurisdiction exclusive of
the courts of the states, of: (1) Any civil case of admiralty or
maritime jurisdiction . . . .10
Although Congress has occasionally altered the statutory scope of
admiralty jurisdiction," the federal courts have, for the most part,
been left with broad discretion in fixing the parameters of ad-
miralty jurisdiction.
The crude boundaries of this jurisdiction were announced in
the case of De Lovio v. Boit, 12 where Mr. Justice Story concluded
that American admiralty jurisdiction:
comprehends all maritime contracts, torts, and injuries: The
latter branch [torts and injuries] is necessarily bound by local-
ity; the former [contracts] extends over all contracts, (where-
soever they may be made or executed . . .) which relate to
the navigation, business, or commerce of the sea. 13
Thus it was the maritime locality of the wrong that rendered a tort
claim cognizable in admiralty. The traditional standard employed
to determine whether a tort is "located" on navigable waters
was laid down by the Supreme Court in The Plymouth:14
[t]he true meaning of the rule of locality in cases of marine
torts . . . [i]s that the wrong and injury complained of must
have been committed wholly upon the high seas or navigable
waters, or, at least, the substance and consummation of the same
must have taken place upon these waters to be within the ad-
miralty jurisdiction. .... 15
The growth of this "strict locality" test has been paralleled by the
development of an alternative standard, under which a maritime
10 Judiciary Act of 1789, ch.20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, as amended, 28 U.S.C. § 1333
(1970).
11 Admiralty Extension Act of 1948, 62 Stat. 496, as amended, 46 U.S.C.
740 (1971). This Act is intended to cover cases where a vessel on navigable
waters causes damage to persons or property on land.
12 7 F.Cases 418 (No C.C.D. Mass. 1815).
13 Id. at 444.
14 70 U.S. (3 Wall.) 20, 34-35 (1866). This case involved the. destruction of a
wharf and a packing house by a fire that had begun on board ship then spread
ashore. The Court held that a libel brought against the ship for the damage done
ashore was not cognizable in admiralty.
15 Id. at 36.
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locality plus a relationship or nexus to traditional maritime activ-
ity is required to invoke the admiralty jurisdiction in cases involv-
ing tort claims.16 Nevertheless, until Executive Jet Aviation v. The
City of Cleveland,7 most courts adhered to a mechanical applica-
tion of the "strict locality" rule 18 and sustained admiralty juris-
diction despite a lack of any connection between the wrong and
traditional forms of maritime commerce and navigation. 19
Although, "for the standard types of maritime torts, the tradi-
tional test has worked quite satisfactorily,' 20 the application of this
test alone to determine admiralty jurisdiction in aviation negligence
cases has presented a particularly difficult question for the courts.
Complications arise when a body of law traditionally concerned
with seagoing vessels is extended to a medium of transportation not
contemplated during the evolution of that body of law. It is some-
what anomalous that admiralty courts should be given jurisdic-
tion over a form of transportation which is usually2l designed and
16 The requirement for a "locality plus" or "maritime nexus" test was first
considered by the United States Supreme Court in Atlantic Trans. Co. of W. Va.
v. Imbrovek, 234 U.S. 52 (1914). The case involved an action for personal
injuries sustained by the plaintiff aboard ship while he was unloading the vessel
in the port of Baltimore. Since the maritime locality of the tort was conceded,
the court found the action cognizable in admiralty but stated that:
. . . if more is required than the locality of the wrong in order to give
the court jurisdiction, the relation of the wrong to maritime service, to
navigation and to commerce on navigable waters, was quite sufficient.
(Id. at 62).
This "locality plus" standard has since been employed by some courts to
avoid the application of admiralty law to cases unrelated to traditional maritime
activities. See e.g., McGuire v. City of New York, 192 F.Supp. 866 (S.D.
N.Y. 1961) (Bather at public beach had no cause of action in admiralty for
injury to hand caused by submerged rock); Peytavin v. Govt. Employees Ins.
Co., 453 F.2d 1121 (5th Cir. 1972) (Admiralty jurisdiction denied for injuries
plaintiff received in a rear end collision on a floating pontoon at a ferry land-
ing).
17 409 U.S. 249 (1972) see note 27 infra.
18 7A. J. MOORE, FEDERAL PRACTICE para. 325[3], at 3526 (2d ed. 1972)
[hereinafter cited as MOORE]. The Supreme Court has recognized the viability
of the "strict locality" test as recently as Victory Carriers Inc. v. Law, 404 U.S.
202 (1971). The Court in holding that there was no admiralty jurisdiction over an
injury to a longshoreman on a dock by stevedore-owned equipment issued a re-
statement to the effect that it still recognized that locality determines maritime
tort jurisdiction.
19 See e.g., Davis v. City of Jacksonville Beach, 251 F. Supp. 327 (M.D. Fla.
1965) (Admiralty jurisdiction applied in case of swimmer injured by surfboard);
King v. Testerman, 214 F. Supp. 335 (E.D. Tenn. 1963) (Admiralty jurisdiction
applied in case concerning injuries to a water skier).
20 Executive Jet, supra, 409 U.S. at 254.
21 Seaplanes, which are subject to maritime rules of the road while they are
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operated to avoid contact with the sea. It is hard to picture a
ship "going down" in anything but water. Yet when a disabled
aircraft "goes down" it is wholly adventitious whether it crashes
on land or on water. Nevertheless, admiralty jurisdiction would be
invoked under the "strict locality" test, accompanied by its full
panoply of substantive maritime law.22 Since Choy v. Pan-Amer-
ican Airways Co.,23 it has been established and consistently
held 24 that a cause of action in admiralty for wrongful deaths
arising from crashes of land-based aircraft occurring on the high
seas (beyond one marine league from shore) exists under
DOSHA. 25
A further extension of admiralty jurisdiction under general
maritime law came in Weinstein v. Eastern Airlines Inc.,2 where
in deciding a wrongful death action arising from the crash of a
commercial jet in the navigable waters of Boston Harbor, the
Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit applied the "strict local-
ity" rule, notwithstanding that the crash occurred within Massachu-
setts territorial waters, thus rendering DOSHA inapplicable.
The Supreme Court has now clearly overruled Weinstein by its
decision in Executive Jet Aviation Inc. v. City of Cleveland.27 The
still on the water, have received varied treatment by admiralty courts: Reinhardt
v. Newport Flying Service Corp., 232 N.Y. 115, 133 N.E. 371 (1921) (Cardozo,
J.: "vessels" while afloat, but not while in the air); U.S. v. Cordova, 89 F.Supp.
298 (E.D. N.Y. 1950) (Not a vessel at any time); Hark v. Antilles Airboats,
note 38 infra. (Admiralty jurisdiction until seaplane reaches (VMC) minimum
control speed).
22 Admiralty jurisdiction benefits a claimant in that he has access to federal
district court without a showing of diversity of citizenship or an amount in
controversy of at least $10,000. He is not limited by venue restrictions but may
bring his action in rem (against the vessel) or in personam (against the owner) in
any district in which he can attach or garnish the credits and effects of the de-
fendant or serve process on him.
Although there is no right to jury trial in admiralty courts, the Savings to
Suitors Clause preserves the option in many cases to maintain an action in state
or, if an independent ground of federal jurisdiction exists, in federal civil courts.
23 1941 A.M.C. 483 (S.D.N.Y. 1941) (Action for wrongful death of pas-
senger of seaplane that crashed into the Pacific Ocean).
24 See e.g., Noel v. Linea Aeropostal Venezolana, 247 F.2d 677 (2d Cir.
1957); Kropp v. Douglass Aircraft Co., 329 F.Supp. 447 (E.D. N.Y. 1971);
Wyman v. Pan American Airways, Inc. 293 N.Y. 878, 59 N.E. 2d 785, aff'g mem.
267 App. Div. 947, 48 NYS 2d 459, aff'g mem. 181 Mics. 963, 43 NYS 2d 420
(Sup. Ct., N.Y. County, 1943).
25 See note 9 supra.
- 316 F.2d 758 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 375 U.S. 940 (1963).
27 409 U.S. 249 (1972) aff'g on other grounds 448 F.2d 151 (6th Cir. 1971).
This unanimous decision by the Supreme Court involved the crash, without loss
of life, of a jet aircraft that had been chartered to fly from Cleveland, Ohio to
[Vol. 8: 220
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"strict locality" test alone will no longer be used to determine
whether aviation tort claims will come under the admiralty juris-
diction of the federal courts: 28
it is far more consistent with the history and purpose of admi-
ralty to require also that the wrong bear a significant relation-
ship to traditional maritime activity. . . . [U]nless such a relation-
ship exists, claims arising from airplaine accidents are not cog-
nizable in admiralty in the absence of legislation to the
contrary.
2 9
Executive Jet is the Supreme Court's most recent and comprehen-
sive pronouncement concerning the issue of admiralty's jurisdic-
tional ambit over aviation tort claims arising from accidents on
or over navigable waters, and represents an effort to limit the
extension of admirality jurisdiction over such torts. 0 The Court
narrowly focused its decision on domestic flights and held that
"there is no federal admiralty jurisdiction over aviation tort claims
arising from flights by land-based aircraft between points within
the continental United States." 3 1  However, the Court expressly
reserved the question of "whether an aviation tort can ever, under
any circumstances, bear a sufficient relationship to traditional
maritime activity to come within admiralty jurisdiction.. "32
[emphasis added]. The thrust of the opinion in Executive Jet is
that the Supreme Court has serious doubts that airplane torts
White Plains, New York via Portland, Maine. The accident occurred shortly
after take off from Burke Lakefront Airport in Cleveland when the jet struck a
flock of sea gulls. The plane lost power when the gulls were ingested into the
plane's engines and as it descended it struck the airport perimeter fence, the
top, of a pick up truck, and settled into the waters of Lake Erie.
The owner sought admiralty jurisdiction in district court alleging negligence
by defendants in clearing the aircraft for take off and in failing to warn of or
remove the sea gulls from the runway. The court dismissed for lack of jurisdic-
tion in admiralty because the tort occurred over land and the flight bore no
relation to maritime commerce. The Court of Appeals affirmed agreeing that
the tort occurred over land.
25 The Court in Executive Jet deemed application of the "strict locality"
test inappropriate to aviation torts since the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction
should be based on historical and logical justification rather than fortuity.
29 409 U.S. at 268.
x Regarding DOSHA, however, the Court considered it as settled that 46
U.S.C. % 761 et seq. gave the federal courts jurisdiction over wrongful death
actions arising out of airplane crashes into the high seas beyond one marine
league but noted that most cases brought under the Act involved 1) a maritime
locality, as well as 2) some relation to maritime commerce and navigation. 409
U.S. at 263.
31 Id. at 274.
32 Id. at 269-271.
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can "ever" bear a significant relationship to "traditional maritime
activity." The Court was quite explicit about what did not con-
stitute such activity. Neither the plight of a survivor of a crash
at sea, nor the fact that a plane goes down on navigable water,
nor the occurrence of negligence "over" such waters "is enough to
create such a relationship to traditional maritime activity as to jus-
tify the invocation of admiralty jurisdiction."33
Besides indicating that the purpose of requiring a "significant
relationship" is to screen out matters which were beyond the
competence of admiralty, the court provides only two examples
where admiralty jurisdiction might be properly invoked on the
ground that the airplane was performing a function traditionally
performed by waterborne vessels: transoceanic flights34 and the un-
usual case of pilots performing duties ordinarily performed by men
in water vessels and actively engaged in the traditional marine
business of fishing.35 Thus, the definition of what does con-
stitute a "significant relationship to traditional maritime activity"
in the context of air commerce has been left to the lower federal
courts for a case-by-case analysis.
As if guided by malign intelligence, a number of aircraft
crashes occurred in 1973 which fell within the area left open by
Executive Jet, that is, maritime tort claims arising from flights out-
side the continental United States.
A significant maritime function was performed by a helicopter
in Higginbotham v. Mobil Oil Corp.,36 while ferrying workmen to
a man-made island (off-shore drilling platform) 100 miles off the
coast of Louisiana. As a result of its crash, a damage claim was
heard in admiralty based on the court's feeling that the helicopter
had been performing the traditional function of a crewboat.
Teachy v. U.S.3 involved the helicopter air-sea rescue of a
33 Id. at 271.
31 Having cleared the air (water?) with regard to the "strict locality" test
Justice Stewart began to muddy the waters with dicta:
It could be argued for instance, that if a plane flying from New York to
London crashed in the mid-Atlantic, there would be admiralty jurisdic-
tion over resulting tort claims even absent a specific statute. An
aircraft in that situation might be thought to bear a significant relation-
ship to traditional maritime activity because it would be performing a
function traditionally performed by waterborne vessels. (Id. at 271).
35 Id. at n.22. Hornsby v. Fish Meal Co., 431 F.2d 865 (5th Cir. 1970) (Mid-
air collision of two light aircraft used in spotting schools of fish and the crash
of those aircraft in the Gulf of Mexico).
3 357 F.Supp. 1164 (W.D. La. 1973).
37 363 F.Supp. 1197 (M.D.Fla.1973).
[Vol. 8: 220
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sailor from a sinking shrimp boat in the Gulf of Mexico. The
plaintiff argued that since sea rescue was a function traditionally
performed by boats, Executive Jet's two-pronged test had been
met. The court avoided ruling on this contention and held that
there was no maritime jurisdiction since the helicopter touched
down, after the rescue, at a Coast Guard base in Key West and
subsequently crashed on a trip to a base at St. Petersburg. Both
bases were points within the continental United States.
In Hark v. Antilles Airboats, Inc., 38 a seaplane, bound for the
island of St. Croix, crashed shortly after take off from the waters
of the harbor of St. Thomas Island. The court found admiralty
jurisdiction because the take off of a seaplane had a distinct
maritime character and alternatively, because the flight, although
not international, was to be conducted primarily outside the ter-
ritorial jurisdiction of the Virgin Islands and over the high seas.
The Hark court found justification for its alternative and broader
holding in that the Supreme Court in Executive jet had restricted
its holding to intracontinental United States flights and had men-
tioned that admiralty jurisdiction over international air commerce
might be justified out of convenience in order to "avoid choice-of-
forum problems, choice-of-law problems, international law prob-
lems, problems involving multiple conventions and treaties, and so
on. ''39
Dicta in Executive Jet suggesting that a transoceanic flight might
be viewed as performing the traditional maritime function of a ship
at sea was considered persuasive in Roberts v. U.S.4° where a
Flying Tiger cargo plane crashed into the sea off the coast of Oki-
nawa on a flight from Los Angeles to Vietnam. The Ninth
Circuit felt that the international nature of the flight and the fact
that transoceanic carriage of cargo could be considered a function
traditionally performed by a freighter, sufficiently met the require-
ments of Executive Jet to invoke admiralty jurisdiction.
Recently, an aircraft crash in the Atlantic Ocean, which oc-
curred on a flight from Atlantic City, New Jersey, to Block Is-
land off the coast of New York, was held to fall outside the juris-
diction of admiralty in the case of American Home Assurance Co. v.
38 355 F.Supp. 683 (D.C. V.I. 1973).
39 409 U.S. at 272.
40 498 F.2d 520 (9th Cir. 1974) Plaintiff in his brief contended that this case
was on "all fours" with Hammill, but the court neglected to mention Poberts,
while citing Higginbotham and Hark as being in accord with the decision in
Hammill.
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U.S.4" Plaintiffs allegation that this was a weather related acci-
dent and that weather problems were a traditional bane of the
seaman did not convince the court that "traditional maritime ac-
tivity" existed since other vehicles face weather problems daily.
As in Higginbotham, supra, the flight in question was from a point
within the continental United States to an island accessible only
by air or sea. This court took a different tack and held that the
fact that Block Island was separated from the mainland was "[i]n-
sufficient alone to distinguish this case from Executive Jet. ... "42
Thus the mere act of crossing navigable waters from a point within
the continent to an island, a service traditionally performed by a
ship, did not impute a maritime function to an airplane.
The Honorable Judge Richey, writing the opinion in Ham-
mill v. Olympic Airways S.A., also found the issues left open by
the Supreme Court squarely before his court. In granting admi-
ralty jurisdiction he considered language 43 in Executive Jet (to the
effect that a transoceanic flight might be viewed as performing the
function of a ship at sea) helpful although not of itself disposi-
tive. 44 The reasoning in Hammill, similar to that in Hark, is that,
although, the defendant's jetliner was engaged in what could be
considered a Greek domestic flight, the portion of the flight over
the international waters of the Mediterranean Sea was similar
in function to that of a coastal vessel involved in island-to-main-
land transport.
The problem with the analysis in Hammill is that it interprets
Executive Jet as permitting automatic admiralty jurisdiction where:
1) The point of departure or destination (or both) of an airplane
is outside the continental United States, 2) A crash occurs in navi-
gable waters and 3) A court can rationalize that the airplane was ful-
filling the traditional maritime function of some suitably-named
boat or ship. 45 Thus every airplane that leaves or arrives at an
island will be considered to be performing a maritime function
simply because in the past only boats provided this service.
The mechanical application of the "locality plus traditional
maritime function" test of Executive Jet by means of such geo-
graphical parameters of departure and destination flies directly in
41 389 F.Supp. 657 (M.D. Pa. 1975) (The plaintiff, American Home Assurance,
was acting as subrogee of Delaware Valley Aviation Inc.).
42 Id. at 658.
43 See note 34 supra.
44 Hammill at 833.
45 Higginbotham, note 36 supra, (crewboat); Hark, note 38 supra, (inter-island
ferry); Roberts, note 40 supra, (ocean freighter).
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the face of the Supreme Court's language which emphasizes the
difference between air and sea transport, not their similarities.
Furthermore, such an interpretation is an unwarranted extension of
the holding of that case, which, when carefully read, reveals that
when the Court said, "there is no . . . admiralty jurisdiction over
. . . flights . . .between points within the continental United
States" [emphasis added] they did not say that there would be
such jurisdiction over flights outside the continental United States.
The overwhelming thrust of the opinion doubts that there could
ever be such jurisdiction.
There are further difficulties with the Hammill court's reliance
on the Supreme Court's hypothetical46 in Executive Jet. The dis-
trict court completely ignored the fact that Justice Stewart ac-
knowledged Professor Moore's argument that there could be no
rational basis for allowing admiralty jurisdiction over claims aris-
ing from a crash into transoceanic waters. 47 According to Moore,
a person injured in such a crash would have a maritime tort action
if the plane went down before reaching shore, but a nonmaritime
claim if the plane managed to remain airborne until reaching shore.
This result would obtain even though the cause of the crash in
both instances may have been the development of engine trouble
or pilot error that occurred at an identical site far out over the
ocean. 48 Moore maintains that such an irrational distinction and
forced application of an inappropriate body of maritime law to avi-
ation torts cannot be justified by the difficult international law
problems inherent in such a flight.49
Traditionally, admiralty has not been a "port of convenience"
nor have its courts been "harbors of avoidance." The substan-
tive law of admiralty has evolved over the centuries, before the
advent of the air age, to handle the problems of vessels which ply
the waterways of the world. Maritime law deals with naviga-
tional ruless° which admiralty courts look to in order to determine
fault. These courts, through long experience, know how to deter-
mine if a "vessel"51 is "seaworthy" and when the relief provi-
46 See note 44 supra.
47 409 U.S. at 271 & n.21.
48 7A J. MoORE, 330[5], at 3772.
49 Id. at 3772-75.
50 The Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 72 Stat. 731, 799, 49 U.S.C. 5 1509(a)
(1970), established that the navigational and shipping laws of the U.S. would
not apply to airplanes.
51 For purposes of maritime law an airplane is not a "vessel." See e.g., The
Crawford Bros. No.2, 215 F. 269 (W.D.Wash. 1914); Reinhardt, note 21 supra.
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sions of "maintenance and cure" are due seamen.52  Yet, the
fault which results in an airplaine's unexpected descent will in-
variably be attributable to a cause unrelated to the sea, whether
it be pilot error, weather, defective design or manufacture of air-
frame or engine, air traffic controller error, or mid-air collision.
Therefore, the determination of causation and liability will be
based on factual and conceptual inquiries unfamiliar to admiralty.
For example, in Harnmill, the crash occurred while the plane
was approaching the Athens airport in foul weather. The pilot
was not following maritime navigational procedures, but was navi-
gating off a land beacon or under the radar control of the Athens
airport. Certainly he was flying IFR (under Instrument Flight
Rules) and the expertise of admiralty law would be of no help in
deciphering these rules to determine the cause of the crash5 3
Despite these inconsistencies, the Hammill court considered admi-
ralty jurisdiction "uniquely appropriate" 4 and noted that admi-
ralty's uniformity recommended its use to avoid various interna-
tional conflicts, and choice-of-law problems confronting the court.
Once the court in Hammill found admiralty jurisdiction, it then
proceeded to assess whether the plaintiff sufficiently pleaded a
maritime cause of action. Recovery for wrongful death in ad-
miralty was theorized under both DOSHA and general maritime
law. The court found that the plaintiff presented a cause of ac-
tion for wrongful death under the general principles of maritime
law sufficient to survive a motion to dismiss. This court considered
it unnecessary to address the possibility of recovery under DOSHA
in light of the new, more expansive common law maritime rem-
edy made available by the Supreme Court in Moragne v. States
Marine Lines, Inc.55 and extended in Sea-Land Services Inc. v. Gau-
det.56
52 Crews of airplanes (airmen) have been deemed not to be "seamen" for
the purposes of admiralty. Accord, King v. Pan-American World Airways, 270 F.2d
355 (9th Cir. 1959); Chance v. United States, 266 F.2d 874 (5th Cir. 1959).
53 See 409 U.S. at 270.
54 Hammill at 834.
55 398 U.S. 375(1970). Moragne involved the death of a longshoreman who
had been working on a vessel within Florida's territorial waters. The de-
cedant's widow sued in state court under Florida's Wrongful Death Statute
alleging negligence and unseaworthiness. Defendant's removal to federal
district court resulted in the dismissal of the unseaworthiness count. Eventually
the issue reached the Supreme Court on certiorari where Justice Harlan wrote a
comprehensive opinion creating a common law remedy for wrongful death under
the principles of general maritime law.
56 414 U.S. 573 (1974). Gaudet, a longshoreman, was seriously injured while
working on a Sea-Land vessel in Louisiana territorial waters. The district
[Vol. 8: 220
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Prior to the Court's unanimous decision in Moragne, there was
no common law action for maritime wrongful death in the absence
of a statute.5 7 Although Justice Harlan's language in Moragne8
seems to make the new maritime action available only where no
federal statutory remedy exists, the Supreme Court spoke again on
the matter in Gaudet, and emphasized that federal statutes do not
enjoy such primacy.5 9  According to Professor Gilmore, Gaudet
has reduced DOSHA's wrongful death provisions to the level of a
"nonstatutory Restatement." 60
As justification for its failure to decide on the applicability
of DOSHA, the court noted that the practical consequences for
the parties would be the same either way the court ruled, since,
in accordance with Justice Harlan's mandate in Moragne,61 the
lower federal courts could fashion an appropriate measure of dam-
ages and not be bound by the provisions of DOSHA. With
borrowed language from Gaudet, the Hammill court advised that if
plaintiff proved his case a remedy would be fashioned which would
extend admiralty's "special solicitude for those men who under-
take to venture upon hazardous and unpredictable sea voyages"
and would "be guided by the principle of maritime law that it
better becomes the humane and liberal character of proceedings in
admiralty to give than withhold a remedy. ... 62
Had the court spoken on the applicability of DOSHA, it
would have been faced with the defendant's contention that Sec-
tion 764, not Section 761 of the Act, applied to this incident.
If this were found to be true, plaintiff would have had to plead
court granted recovery to his estate for personal injuries in a suit based on un-
seaworthiness. (He died while the recovery was being appealed). Thereafter
Mrs. Gaudet brought a wrongful death action under Moragne to recover for her
own loss as a result of her husband's death. The district court denied re-
covery, the circuit court -reversed, and the Supreme Court, on certiorari, upheld
the circuit court's reversal and allowed the widow to recover damages for loss
of support, services, society, and funeral expenses.
s7 Moragne explicitly overruled The Harrisburg, 119 U.S.199 (1866), which
had denied recovery for wrongful death under maritime law.
5s 398 U.S. at 402.
59 414 U.S. at 583, 588 & n.22.
60 G. GILMORE, THE LAW OF ADMIRALTY, § 6-33 (2d ed.1975):
The maritime death remedy as explicated in Gaudet, is now more
comprehensive and provides for a greater recovery than had previously
been available under the federal death statutes or most state death
statutes.
See G. GILMORE § 6-33 at 374, for an interesting discussion of the trend towards
de-codification. [hereinafter cited as G. GILMORE].
61 398 U.S. at 408; see also G. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 368.
62 Hammill at 837.
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and prove Greek law in this federal admiralty court, to recover
under DOSHA.63
The maritime claim in Hammill was not exclusively cogniz-
able in admiralty. In Moragne, Justice Harlan suggested that ac-
tions for wrongful death on the high seas could be brought under
the Savings to Suitors Clause64 in nonadmiralty courts with a right
to jury trial.65 However, this court failed to address the viability
of this theory of recovery and considered it irrelevant 66 since the
amended complaint of the plaintiff did not reflect a request for
jury trial. This is one of the main advantages of a suit brought on
the "civil side" of a federal district court. In any case, absent
a declaration in the plaintiff's complaint identifying the claim as an
admiralty claim6 "and if an independent nonadmiralty ground of
63 In response to plaintiff's claim of recovery under DOSHA, 46 U.S.C.
§§ 761 et seq., defendant contended that the claim was exclusively governed by
764 which provides in pertinent part:
Whenever a right of action is granted by the law of any foreign state
on account of death by wrongful act, neglect, or default occurring on the
high seas such right may be maintained in an appropriate action in
admiralty in the courts of the U.S ...
There is authority to support this contention, where an American citizen has
been killed on a foreign carrier that crashes into the high seas (such as the death
in Hammill) and the applicable foreign law provides a recovery for wrongful
death as defendants maintained it did. See Bergeron v. Koninklijke Luchtvaart
Maatschappij, N.V., 188 F. Supp. 594, 597, (S.D. N.Y. 1960); Noel v. L.A.V.,
note 70 supra; the Vestris, 53 F.2d 847 (S.D. N.Y. 1931); 1. Kreindler, 1 AVIATION
AccIDENT LAW § 2.10 (2) (b) (i) (Rev. ed. 1974); Comment, 51 CAL, L. REv., 389,
395, (1963).
The fact that the crash occurred inside the Greek territorial limit does not
seem to render § 764 of DOSHA inapplicable since the "within one marine
league" restriction was probably intended by Congress to apply to American
territorial restrictions only. See Roberts v. U.S., supra note 40, at 524 & n.7;
51 CAL. L. REV., at 397. Defendant noted that plaintiff should have pleaded
Greek law when bringing an action under the laws of that foreign carrier's na-
tion. The following cases, dealing with foreign air carriers crashing into the high
seas and resulting in wrongful death actions brought under DOSHA, applied
those countries' laws and support defendant's contention: Fernandez v. L.A.V.,
156 F. Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y. 1957), (Libel based on § 764 dismissed because
Venezualan law insufficiently pleaded); lafrate v. Compagnia Generale Trans-
atlantique, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D. N.Y. 1952), (Claim based on French wrongful
death law dismissed because insufficiently pleaded).
64 See note 8 supra.
65 See note 22 supra.
66 Hammill, supra, at 836-837.
61 A federal district court may, in its admiralty posture, hear claims under 28
U.S.C. § 1333 or the admiralty suit may, through the Savings to Suitors Clause
of § 1333, be considered under 28 U.S.C. § 1332 by the same judge on the same
docket under what used to be called the "civil side" of the federal court; as-
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jurisdiction appears, the action will go forward under general civil
procedure, not subject to the special provisions made for cases in
which the admiralty jurisdiction is invoked."68  Since the first
theory of recovery in plaintiff's complaint did plead the requisite
diversity and jurisdictional amount to provide a nonadmiralty
ground of jurisdiction and because plaintiff failed to invoke the dis-
tinctively maritime procedures referred to in Rule 9(h) of the Fed-
eral Rules of Civil Procedure,69 this action could probably have
been decided on the "civil side" of the court even without the
special advantage of a jury trial.
Since the plaintiff, a Virginia resident, brought suit against
the defendant foreign air carrier which was doing business in
Washington, D.C., a determination of jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§1332 would require a choice-of-law analysis under the Washing-
ton D.C. Choice-of-Law Doctrine. 0 The memoranda of the parties
reflect an agreement that under this doctrine the federal courts
of the District of Columbia would apply the law of the jurisdic-
tion with "the most substantial or significant interest." The type
of "contacts" to be taken into account in making this determina-
tion are:
suning, of course, that the requisite diversity of citizenship and jurisdictional
amount have been pleaded. Where two such possibilities exist, to establish
jurisdiction, the claimant may elect admiralty. See, FED. R. Civ. P. 9 (i) which
provides in pertinent part:
A pleading or count setting forth a claim for relief within the admiralty
and maritime jurisdiction that is also within the jurisdiction of the dis-
trict court on some other ground may contain a statement identifying
the claim as an admiralty or maritime claim . . .
An allegation that a claim is within admiralty jurisdiction without a state-
ment that identifies the pleadings as an admiralty claim has been held in-
sufficient for the purposes of Rule 9(h), to invoke the special admiralty pro-
cedures and remedies. Banks v. Hanover S.S. Corp., 43 F.R.D. 374, 376-77
(D.C. Md. 1967); 5 WRIGHT & MILLER, MODERN FEDERAL PLEADING AND PRACTICE
§ 1313 & n.35 (1969).
The advisory committee note to Rule 9, as amended, explains that in order
to invoke the distinctively maritime procedures referred to in Rule 9(h) the
magic words, "This is an admiralty or maritime claim within the meaning of
Rule 9(h)" or their equivalent must be found within the complaint. See 28
U.S.C.A. FED. R. Civ. P. Appendix of Forms, form 2(d).
Plaintiff in his amended complaint failed to do this. Paragraph 20 of that
complaint merely reads, "Jurisdiction is founded upon 18 [sic] United States
Code, § 1333 and 46 United States Code, % 761 et seq."
61 G. GILMORE, supra note 60, at 55 1-9.
6' See note 67 supra.
70 Erie v. Tompkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938); Klaxon Co. v. Stentor, Electric
Mfg. Co. Inc., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); Long v. Pan American World Airways, 16
N.Y.2d 337, 266 N.Y.S.2d 513, 213 N.E.2d 796 (1965).
1976]
CASE W. RES. J. INT'L L.
(a) The place where the injury occurred,
(b) The place where the conduct causing the injury oc-
curred,
(c) The domicile, residence, nationality, place of incorpo-
ration and business of the parties, and
(d) The place where the relationship if any, between the
parties is centered.71
The plaintiffs decedent bought her ticket in Corfu, flew on a one-
way, non-stop, Greek domestic flight and was killed in a crash
in Greek waters as a result of an unknown cause which could only
have originated and had its impact within Greece. It is likely that
Greece would have "the most significant interest" thus necessi-
tating that the plaintiff plead and prove Greek law.71
Not only was the Hammill court's use of admiralty jurisdiction
useful to avoid the choice-of-law problems of DOSHA and the
conflict-of-law problems inherent in a diversity action under Title
28 U.S.C. §1332 on the "civil side," but admiralty jurisdiction con-
veniently allowed the court to side-step the complicated interna-
tional law problem posed by plaintiff's theory of recovery under the
Warsaw Convention. Had the court ruled on the theory of recov-
ery under the Montreal Agreement, 73 amending the Warsaw Con-
vention, the plaintiff's opportunity to enjoy an American forum
would have been endangered. Olympic Airways S.A. is a signatory
of the Convention.7 4  Greek law has adopted and would apply the
Convention to airplane accidents arising from Greek domestic
flights.75 Article 28(1) of the Warsaw Convention has been re-
71 1 RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICTS OF LAWS §§ 6 & 145 (1971).
72 See e.g., Tramontana v. S.A. Empresade Visceo Aerea Rio Grandense,
350 F.2d. 468 (D.C. cir. 1965), cert. den., 383 U.S. 943 (1966), which held that
Brazil had contacts superior to those of the District of Columbia in an airline
crash, similar to the one at bar, and applied Brazilian law.
When applying the law 'of the foreign carrier's nation defendant urged that
plaintiff should have pleaded Greek Law. The following cases, dealing with
foreign air carrier crashes into the high seas and resulting in wrongful death
actions brought under DOSHA, applied that country's laws and support de-
fendant's contention: Fernandez v. L.A.V., 156 F.Supp. 94 (S.D.N.Y.1957)
(Libel based on § 764 dismissed because Venezuaelan law insufficiently pleaded);
lafrate v. Compagne Generale Translantique, 106 F. Supp. 619 (S.D.N.Y.
1952) (Claim based on French Wrongful death law dismissed because insuffi-
ciently pleaded.).
73 See note 5 supra.
74 L. KREINDLER, 1 AvIATION ACCIDENT LAW, at § 12A.03.
75 Hammill at 831. Adherence to the Warsaw Convention by this signatory
nation for crashes emanating from its domestic flights is an extension of art.l of
the Warsaw Convention which limits applicability to "international transpor-
tation" only.
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peatedly invoked to prevent suit in a court which does not sit in
the territory of a "high contracting party. "76 In this case the
United States was not one of the four places described in Article
28(1) and therefore was not a "high contracting party." Assuming
that Article passed Constitutional muster,77 plaintiff could have
been foreclosed from bringing an action in this country.
As such, it would have been necessary to plead in Greek courts
which would apply the Hague Protocol7 and limit recovery to
approximately $18,000. On the other hand, if the court had con-
strued the venue provisions of Article 28(1) so as to allow an ac-
tion under the Convention in the United States, the basic liability
limitations of the Convention would have also been binding7 9
Even assuming that the Warsaw Convention might not be self-
executing, 80 there is support s for the proposition that:
Regardless of whether actions involving aircraft of flights
within the scope of the Warsaw Convention are based on the
Death on the High Seas Act, the general maritime law, a state
statute, or the common law the limitation provisions of the con-
vention are [still] held to apply.82 [emphasis added].
76 Article 28(1) of the Convention provides:
An action for damages must be brought, at the option of the plaintiff
in the territory of one of the high contracting parties, either before the
court of the domicile of the carrier or of his principal place of busi-
ness, or where he had a place of business, through which the contract
has been made, or before the court at the place of destination.
7 The constitutionality of art. 28(1) of the Convention has been vehemently
disputed; See Burdell v. Canadian Pacific Airlines Ltd., 1968 U.S.Av.R. 1133,
1145 Vol.111, 10 AVI. 18, 151 (State of 11. Cir. Ct., Cook County 1968); 6
ALR3d 1272 (1966); Donald Haskell, The Warsaw System and the U.S. Constitu-
tion Revisited, 39 J. OF AIR L. AND Comm. 483, 490 (1973); J. Kennelly, Aviation
Law: International Air Travel - A Brief Diagnosis and Prognosis, 56 CHIC. BAR
REC. No.4, 178, 189-90 (Jan.-Feb. 1975).
78 C.A.B. Order No. E23680, at 2; J. KENNELLV, supra note 77, at 182.
79 Block v. Compagnie National Air France, 229 F.Supp. 801 (N.D. Ga.
1964), aff'd 386 F. 2d 323 (5th Cir. 1967). The legal effect given to an interna-
tional treaty by the United States Constitution elevates the Warsaw Conven-
tion to the level of an Act of Congress; i.e. "the supreme law of the land." U.S.
CONST. art VI, cl.2; see D. Haskell, supra note 77, at 493.
80 Cases and commentators have repeatedly disputed that the Convention
creates an independent cause of action, e.g.., Noel v. L.A.V., 247 F.2d 677
(2d cir.1957), cert. denied 355 U.S. 907 (1957); 1 L. KREINDLER, AvIATION Acci-
DENT LAW § 11.08 & § 1601 [3] (Rev. 1974); 66 ALR 2d 997 (1959); but see,
J. Moore & Pelaez, Admiralty Jurisdiction - The Sky's the limit, 33 J. OF AIR L.
AND Comm. 3, 31-32 (1967).
81 See e.g., Eck v. United Arab Airlines, Inc. 15 N.Y.2d 53, 203 N.E.2d 640
255 NYS 2d 249 (1964); Noel v. L.A.V., 72 note supra; 66 ALR2d 897 (1959);
J. Moore and Pelaz, supra note 70, at 29-30.
82 J. Moore and Pelaz, supra note 81, at 29-30.
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Since there are many ways in which the Warsaw Convention
could have limited the liability of the defendant, the court should
have been stimulated to pass on the applicability of that treaty.
The Hammill court failed to point out any restrictions on damages.
Quite the contrary, although not required to address the issue of
damages at this point, the court implied that it had almost un-
bridled discretion in fashioning a remedy and advised that such a
remedy would be a liberal one, "not bound by . . . the nature
and scope of the remedies afforded by existing relevant federal
and state statutes."3 It is suggested that such dictas4 could have
misled the defendant into believing he would be liable for damages
in excess of Warsaw Convention limits and that this could have
substantially prejudiced the defendant in settlement negotiations.
The Hammill court said that the possibility that the Saving
Clause afforded plaintiff a common-law cause of action for wrong-
ful death was a "consideration worthy of mention."5 The court
neglected to, but should have mentioned the parallel theories of
recovery under DOSHA and the Warsaw Convention in the in-
terests of judicial economy. If, on appeal, this court had been
reversed for a finding of maritime jurisdiction based on its inter-
pretation of Executive Jet, its failure to pass on these issues would
have necessitated a rehearing at the district court level. Such a
determination, although not mandatory, would have also served
both the interests of expediency and justice. Clarification on
these points would have assisted both parties in preparing for dis-
covery and trial, or as it turned out, in negotiating a settlement.86
Faced with such a complex array of international, choice-of-law
and choice-of-forum problems, it is not surprising that the Ham-
mill court sought refuge in the harbor of admiralty. The Supreme
Court allowed such shelter by restricting the denial of admiralty
jurisdiction to intracontinental flights. The other theories of ju-
risdiction could have deprived the plaintiff of an American forum
for his action and set him adrift on the unpredictable waters of
Greek law. To have abandoned the plaintiff in such a manner
would have been to ignore the general tendency (albeit visceral
and paternalistic in origin) of admiralty courts to apply American
law in any personal injury or death case where the action is
83 Hammill at 837.
R4 Id.
85 Hammill at 836.
86 The case never went to trial but was settled for an undisclosed amount.
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brought by a citizen of the United States, regardless of the fact
that the injury occurred in a foreign flag vessel in foreign waters. 87
Admiralty law developed in this country to deal with the vaga-
ries and legal problems of the shipping industry. At first, it was
believed that the law of admiralty could adapt to the legal prob-
lems of the air age. In a quixotic attempt to provide an American
forum and uniform body of law for claims resulting from injuries
and death outside the United States, admiralty courts such as this
one have strained to find fictional similarities between ships and
aircraft, somewhat akin to their historical endeavor to personify the
ship. But, as the Supreme Court noted in Executive Jet, 88 the
multidimensional nature of flying and resultant problems have
rapidly outstripped the expertise of admiralty. This is especially
true now that air travel may exceed the speed of sound by many
times and is rapidly approaching the point where it will no longer be
bound by the earth's gravitational pull. These factors call for the
development of a specialized uniform body of aviation law.
The Warsaw Convention was enacted to provide uniformity in
the treatment of claims arising from "international" air travel.89
Yet, much criticism has centered on the plight of an international
traveller, such as Ms. Caroline Hammill Cagle, who happens to
take a side-trip and, while off her planned itinerary, purchases a
ticket from a foreign carrier in a foreign country, with an ultimate
destination someplace other than the United States. Such a pas-
senger does not have a right to sue in the United States for her
injuries even though the carrier may have had a secondary place
of business in this country. The Guatemala Protocol ° will cor-
rect some of these inequities and become the comprehensive new
law of international airline liability if ratified by the United States.
Until it is so ratified, the Convention has not accomplished its
objective.
To provide uniformity in domestic air travel, the Supreme
Court, in Executive Jet, suggested that Congress provide uniform
federal treatment for aviation tort claims, wherever they occur, by
17 G. GILMORE at 473-74.
88 409 U.S. at 268-70.
19 A. LOWENFELD, AVIATION LAW § 2.1, VI-26 (1972).
90 Article XII of the Guatemala Protocol will expand art. 28(1) of the Warsaw
Convention by allowing an action to be brought in the country of a passenger's
domicile or permanent residence, provided the airline has "an establishment"
there. See, L. KREINDLER § 12B.03[8]. Thus the Hatnnill plaintiff would have
probably been able to sue Olympic Airways S.A. if the Guatemala Protocol
would have been in effect.
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means of the Commerce Clause. 91 Indeed, Senator Tydings (D-
Md.) introduced legislation for a comprehensive body of federal
law governing civil legal relations and acts arising out of aviation
activity.9 2 Unfortunately, the bill stalled in committee when the
impetus provided by Senator Tydings ended with his failure to be
re-elected.
Recently, several federal courts have suggested that there
should be a federal common law of aviation. 93 This result can-
not be obtained without the abrogation, by the Supreme Court, of
the Erie doctrine as it is applied to aviation diversity cases today. 94
Kohr v. Allegheny Airlines, Inc., 95 represents a major step in this
direction. The Seventh Circuit held, in this diversity case, that in-
stead of applying Indiana law on the issue of contribution and in-
demnification, a prevailing federal interest in uniform air regula-
tion called for a federal law of contribution and indemnification
to govern mid-air collisions with resultant choice-of-law problems.
91 Such a federal statute could allow state and federal courts jurisdiction
over aviation negligence claims just as they do over federal question cases,
with admiralty having jurisdiction over none of them. See e.g., Sweeney, Is
Special Aviation Liability Legislation Essential, 19 J. AIR L. AND COMM. 166, 317
(1952).
92 S. 3305, S. 3306 and S. 4089, 90th Cong., 2d Sess. (1968); and S. 961,
91st Cond., 1st Sess. (1969). See generally Sanders, The Tydings Bill, 36 J.AIR.L.
AND COM. 550 (1970); Tydings, Air Crash Litigation, A Judicial Problem and a
Congressional Solution 18 AM. U.L. REV. 299 (1968).
93 See e.g., Humphrey v. Lann 487 F.2d (6th Cir. 1973); Gabel v.
Hughes Air Corp 350 F.Supp. 757 (S.D. Ohio 1972) See also
Keefe and Devalerio Dallas, Dred Scott and Eyrie Erie, 38 J.AIR L. AND COM. 107
(1972).
94 The Erie doctrine, Erie v. Tomkins, 304 U.S. 64 (1938), requires a federal
district court in diversity cases to apply state substantive law defining the rights
and obligations of persons with respect to the state-created cause of action.
Today aviation negligence suits based on diversity jurisdiction filed in many
district courts are often consolidated in one federal district court under the
Multidistrict Litigation Act of 1970, 82 Stat. 109, as amended 28 U.S.C. % 1407
et seq. (1973). The federal district court in which the cases are consolidated
must apply the law of the forum in accordance with Klaxon Co. v. Stentor
Electric Mfg. Co., 313 U.S. 487 (1941); See also, Keefe, Gilhholey, Bailey and
Day, In Praise of Joseph Story, Swift v. Tyson and the True National Common Law,
18 AM. U.L. REV. 316 (1968).
% 504 F. 2d 400 (7th Cir. 1974), Cert. den. 421 U.S. 978 (1975). This case
arose from a mid-air collision between an Allegheny Airliner and a private air-
craft over Indiana. A wrongful death diversity action ensued followed by cross-
claims, third party claims, and answers which raised the issue of contribution and
indemnification. The district court ruled that Indiana law applied and that
there was no right to contribution and indemnification. The Seventh Circuit
reversed and held that federal law would govern and allow contribution and
indemnity on a comparative negligence basis.
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If the Hammill court had allowed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C.
§1332 to be triggered by the Savings to Suitors Clause % a similar
approach could have provided uniform treatment for the defendant
who was doing business in Washington, D.C. and the Virginia
plaintiff. Instead, the court applied admiralty law to an airplane
crash merely because of the fortuity that the departure point was
an island and the plane happened to "come down" on navigable
waters - a patchwork solution to a large-scale problem.
PHILLIP J. KOLCZYNSKI
6 See note 70 supra.
